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This chapter examines the corporation as a moral agent for sustainable development. 
While sustainable development in business organizations can be argued from utility- 
and duty-based ethical theories, it is suggested that virtue-based ethics is needed to 
develop a moral agency for sustainable development, as it focuses on the organizational 
character. In addition, it is proposed that the biosphere (the global sum of all 
ecosystems) is accepted as the ultimate principal for all planetary agents to avoid an 
anthropocentric and only inward-looking position typical for ethical theories. Thus, a 
business organization can work as a nexus for virtue and develop a moral agency that 
contributes to the well-being of the biosphere and all of its members. 
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Humanity is on the edge (Brown 2011), as current development has pushed, and 
continues pushing us over the safe operating space on the planet. According to 
Rockström et al. (2009), the transgression of planetary boundaries may trigger 
nonlinear, abrupt environmental change with catastrophic consequences. The worst-case 
scenario is a sixth mass extinction and the subsequent collapse of human civilization 
(Barnosky et al. 2011). To avoid such a tragedy, we need development that does not 
endanger existence but sustains and embraces it. 
 
In this quest for more desirable development, the UN’s Brundtland Commission made 
famous the concept of sustainable development. The report has been rightly criticized 
(see e.g., Hueting 1990; Lele 1991). Besides ignoring the needs of the nonhuman world, 
it reinforces the false assumption that economic development is a necessity for solving 
environmental problems. In so doing, the report falls short of identifying the root causes 
of unsustainable development, namely, the expansion of human needs and economic 
activity (Heikkurinen and Bonnedahl 2013). Nevertheless, while there are clear 
inadequacies in the report, it importantly legitimized the so-called spatial and temporal 
dimensions in the sustainability debate. Spatial sustainability refers to meeting the 
needs of the present generations in different places (or spaces) so that overriding 
priority is given to the essential needs of the world’s poorest people. This spatial 
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sustainability can be extended to cover all beings, not merely humans, to avoid the 
critique toward anthropocentrism. (According to the Merriam-Webster online 
dictionary, anthropocentric refers to (1) “considering human beings as the most 
significant entity of the universe” and/or (2) “interpreting or regarding the world in 
terms of human values and experiences.”) Temporal sustainability refers to sustainable 
development in time. What this means is that if we are to ensure that future generations 
can meet their own needs, we have to start conserving natural resources and fostering 
the vitality of our planet’s ecological processes. Since human labor, technology, and 
economics are no substitute for these resources and processes (Daly 1996), temporal 
sustainability goes well together with non-anthropocentric spatial sustainability. 
In practice, if we are to achieve development that can be sustained, we humans must 
adapt the nature of our activities to the carrying capacity of the planet and start caring 
for beings in need (in both time and space). Moreover, given our dependency on highly 
complex ecological processes that lie beyond current scientific understanding, the 
caring cannot be limited to the humans but must also include the animal, vegetable, and 
mineral kingdoms. Thus, any development ought to proceed with precaution so that we 
do not destabilize the delicate balance of the biosphere, the global sum of all 
ecosystems. 
 
This rationale has profound implications for every human actor, as it leads us to 
conclude that the current state of affairs is unacceptably unsustainable, and we must 
therefore radically change. The present chapter argues that sustaining and embracing the 
diversity of all life forms should not be seen only through its utility for mankind (utility-
based ethics) but also as a moral duty (duty-based ethics) and, most importantly, an 
activity that a virtuous character does (virtue-based ethics). Becoming a virtuous moral 
agent for sustainable development is not merely a possibility for business practitioners 
but also an ethical necessity in the midst of ecological and humanitarian turmoil. 
 
 
Organization as a Moral Character 
 
In recent decades, we have witnessed an increase in the presence and power of 
corporate actors (Coghlan and MacKenzie 2011). This restructuring of societal life has 
come to mean that business managers have put themselves into a position where they 
are acting as significant agents for development, whether this will be sustainable or 
unsustainable. Attempting to sustain and embrace all forms of life in time and space is 
not a modest responsibility and should not therefore be left to the vagaries of the market 
and corporate actors (Heikkurinen 2013). However, given the current powerful position 
of business organizations in relation to our futures, it is very meaningful to examine the 
moral character of the corporation in detail. 
 
While some authors deny the moral character of the corporation, others perceive the 
business organization as a moral character (French 1979; Collier 1995) and that “it is 
both meaningful and efficacious to ascribe the competency for conscious and intentional 
behavior to organizations” (Pruzan 2001, p. 271). After all, business organizations do 
consist of humans who have morality as an inherent characteristic. So, as well as having 
values, actions, and strategies, corporations can also have moral responsibilities 
(Goodpaster and Matthews 2003). This implies that an organization, as a collectivity, 
can possess competencies normally attributed to individuals, i.e., to reflect, evaluate, 
learn, and make considered choices (Pruzan 2001). Pruzan (2001, p. 277) explains 
further: 
 
It is a common experience than when individuals, each with their own values, preferences and 
expectations, meet to decide on matters of importance to an organization they belong to and for 
which they feel a sense of responsibility, a new, implicit – and shared – value can develop amongst 
the participants. This shared value which emerges in the group is to serve the organization – to 
reinforce both its identity and the sense of responsibility they have with respect to the organization 
as a whole – and to arrive at decisions which are acceptable for all the participants. 
 
Thus, according to Moore (1999, p. 341), “the issue becomes whether we can speak 
only of the moral character of individuals within the context of organizations or 
whether, in addition, we can speak of the moral character of the organisation as a 
whole.” In other words, the idea of moral character denotes an organization’s ability to 
make moral choices. Which choices are then made and how the decisions are reached 
arguably depend on the organizational character at issue. And what is important here is 
that by accepting the idea of organizational moral character, we are able to discuss the 
moral agency of the corporation. 
 
 
Moral Agency of the Corporation 
 
Research on corporate moral agency connects to two important streams of research, 
namely, structure–agency and principal–agent debates. The first is concerned on a 
broad debate on structure versus agency that attempts to explain why organizations act 
in a specific manner. At one extreme, a group of scholars claim that structure (for 
instance, societal institutions) determines organizational behavior, while the other 
extreme posits that organizations are independent and free to act in any manner they 
wish. The middle ground here would be to say that while agents have a degree of 
autonomy, they are also constrained by the structures in which they are embedded. 
At a first glance, this notion might appear slightly trivial and then seem somewhat 
paradoxical, but lastly it somehow ends up feeling intuitively pleasing. The reason for 
this can be found, for instance, in the following thought: if agents are not treated as one 
homogeneous group, the paradox starts to evaporate. So, it is suggested that an all-
encompassing view on how agents act in relation to structures is and will not be 
available to us. There is no single type of agency that shapes organizational behavior or 
is being shaped by structures. Thus, we need to carefully study agents in relation to 
different sorts of structures, as agents differ in how they act in relation to them. This 
means that the structure–agency problem is not an either/or question but more nuanced. 
Agency and structure are hence considered as complementary rather than opposing 
forces (Bourdieu 1977). Structure influences human behavior, while humans are also 
capable of changing the social structures in which they are embedded (Giddens 1984). 
Another stream of research has approached the question of moral agency from another 
point of view. In explaining organizational behavior, agents have been examined in 
relation to their principals. This principal–agent problem explores, e.g., whose interests 
the agents are serving. Typically, in organization and management studies, the so-called 
agency theory has been applied between corporate managers (agents) and corporate 
shareholders (principals) (for a review see Eisenhardt 1989). The realization that 
managers (agents) do not always act in line with the desires of shareholders (principals) 
was significant for the field of management science. It meant that academic scholars 
needed to find better ways to enable the owning class (principals) to keep track of and 
control the agents (managers and employees) for their purposes. Nevertheless, what is 
important here is the discovery that agency is not limited to considering shareholders as 
the only principals. Modern actors are, on the contrary, authorized agents for various 
interests (Meyer and Jepperson 2000). And if we consider organization as the agent, 
then we can regard its principals to basically be anything whose interests the agent 
serves. This leads us to assume that agents can in fact have many principals. These can 
be individuals and/or groups of beings, even imaginary friends. Which objects are then 
chosen as the principals is a question of organizational politics, but importantly also 
influenced by the worldview of managers. 
 
 
Biosphere as the Principal and Structure for the Agent 
 
In sustainable development, overriding priority is given to the vital needs of the world’s 
most disadvantaged beings, as well as the needs of future beings. Thus, for an 
organizational agent aiming at sustainable development, the principals are the current 
and future beings combined. It is not of great significance what the entity of 
metaphysical life should be referred to as (be it the universe, prana, god, web of life, or 
another similar term), but what is important is to acknowledge, respect, and protect the 
entity that enables physical, material life on this planet. While the significance of the 
sun and other objects in outer space should be acknowledged, the emphasis in the search 
for sustainable development is still meaningful to keep on the current and future 
inhabitants of the Earth. The principal of highest rank is then the ecological entity on the 
planet, the biosphere. 
 
The international scientific community has never been as unanimous that climate 
change is largely anthropogenic. This means that organized human actions have had an 
effect on the balance of the biosphere. In the light of scientific knowledge, we also 
know that our actions have led to the collapse of ecosystems, which may lead to the 
next mass extinction, in which over 75 % of the species may be lost (Barnosky et al. 
2011). In such a worst-case scenario, it is no longer meaningful to discuss the needs of 
the current and future beings. Assuming that we are to survive the extinction wave, the 
primitive search for food and shelter will become an intrinsic part of everyday life. 
In any case, it is fair to suggest that the biosphere is the ultimate structure and principal 
for all agents on the planet Earth. Ecosystems (that together comprise the biosphere) 
form the structure in which all humans and organizations are embedded. This 
ecosystemic structure holds material life and existence together on our planet. Thus, if 
we are to sustain existence and foster life within the biosphere, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the biosphere is also the principal. For organization and management 
studies, the biosphere as the ultimate principal means that radically new ways of 
organizing economic activities must be found. This needed change, however, 
necessitates the development of a type of moral character. Normative ethical theories 
may help us in this task. 
 
 
Normative Ethical Theories and Sustainable Development 
 
Normative ethical theories analyze and suggest to us what is a morally sound way of 
acting in a specific situation. These theories study the norms in ethics and attempt to 
answer the question of what is right or wrong. There are three main normative ethical 
theories that express on a rather generic level why certain actions are more desirable 
than others. These theories are utility-based, duty-based, and virtue-based ethics. For 
sustainable development in business organizations, each of them offers a different kind 
of rationale for engaging in sustainability. 
 
Utility-based ethics: sustainability as a utility. Utility-based ethics considers that the 
consequences of an act are morally significant. The most famous utilitarian ethicists are 
Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick. According to these scholars, 
an act is morally sound if it produces the maximum amount of overall utility for the 
general good. Utility-based analysis weighs between the utility and harm produced by 
an act and then advises choosing the least harm and maximum utility. In Mill’s book 
Utilitarianism (1861), utility becomes translated into happiness, pleasure, and an 
absence of pain. In economics and management science, the tool for conducting such 
evaluations is cost–benefit analysis. This analysis typically assigns a monetary value to 
all things, be they humans or nonhuman objects. The strength of utility-based ethics is 
that if offers a generic principle for all ethical problems, but it also has many major 
weaknesses. On the ontological level, the problem is that utility-based ethics reduces 
thinking and actions to consider all objects as means or instruments for something else. 
However, we humans often also give intrinsic value to others and ourselves. An 
epistemological problem again is that we never know the outcomes of our actions in 
advance. So, how are we supposed to conduct an analysis without such knowledge? 
This leads us to a methodological problem of utility-based ethics. It assumes that we are 
able (and willing) to assign a value to all beings and objects and be able to estimate the 
utility for the general good. However, because we are often unable to do this in practice, 
the ethics can easily lead to egoistic ethics, in which a person or an organization 
considers the overall utility as a synonym for personal utility (Ketola 2008a). 
Furthermore, thinking only about the utility of objects can lead to intuitively rather 
repulsive mental models, such as killing 50 now to save 100 later. But be that as it may, 
in the context of sustainable development, utility-based ethics could suggest that an 
organization should act sustainably, because sustainable action has higher utility for 
humanity than unsustainable action. This position could be described as “sustainability 
as a utility.” 
 
Duty-based ethics: sustainability as a duty. Since in utility-based ethics the motives of 
the actor do not matter, we should complement our inquiry for sustainable development 
with duty-based ethics. The founding father of this school of thought was Immanuel 
Kant. Contrary to utility-based ethics, in which moral goodness is dependent on the 
utility an act can deliver, duty-based ethics puts the intention and motives of an act on 
center stage. The motives are important, because if an organization merely attempts to 
match its good deeds with the available utility, it ends up delivering as little goodness as 
possible. In other words, the utilitarian rationale leads us to a situation where only the 
minimum amount of a moral act is practiced. And assuming that such a calculation was 
possible, when the utility is no longer available, good deeds would no longer be done. 
To put this problem in the context of sustainable development, preserving and fostering 
the existence of life would stop when utility for humans was no longer delivered. 
Hence, to avoid these problems of the utilitarian mind, duty-based ethics offers a tool 
for thought, namely, the categorical imperative. In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, Kant (1785) put forward the basic premise of the imperative, which is to “Act 
only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law” (Kant 1785/2009, p. 30). The categorical imperative also proposes that a 
person should act in a manner in which one treats humanity not only as means but also 
as ends in itself. In other words, the main idea is to form principles for action that create 
a duty for the agent and hold in every situation. An individual can arrive at such a 
principle by thinking rationally whether the principle could be a universal law. Morality 
is thus not a mechanical calculus exercise on the pros and cons for different people in 
different situations, but the duty of an agent that is based on predetermined obligations 
and rules. While this view on ethics provides an important supplement to our moral 
inquiry for sustainability, it falls short on some aspects. For instance, as duty ethics 
emphasizes rationality, emotions are left outside the moral decision-making. Yet, they 
are a key part of being human. Also, one could ask: is not the development of a moral 
character more important than the rules and guidelines that obligate the agent? In any 
case, in the context of sustainable development, duty-based ethics importantly suggests 
that an organization should always act sustainably because it is its duty, as the principle 
of sustainable actions meets the requirement of the categorical imperative. This position 
could be described as “sustainability as a duty.” 
 
Virtue-based ethics: sustainability as a virtue. Duty-based ethics, which emphasizes 
motives (ethical input), is complementary to utility-based ethics, which emphasizes 
consequences (ethical output). In between lies virtue-based ethics, which places 
emphasis on the development of an agent’s character (ethical process). According to 
Ketola (2008a, p. 422), the ethics of virtue originate from the works of “Socrates, Plato 
and particularly Aristotle” (384–322 BC). This approach to morality gives priority to 
neither good motives nor good consequences but considers both of them to be 
connected to a virtuous character. The analysis is focused on determining what kind of 
character an organization has if we consider its whole life cycle. Thus, central to the 
virtue theory are not the guidelines or utility of a single act but a good life overall. In 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (348 BC/1999) “describes a virtue as an attitude that 
makes people good and helps them do their work well” (Ketola 2008a, p. 422). The 
same idea could be applied to collectives such as organizations, such that virtue makes 
organizations morally good and helps them in their practices. Furthermore, for Aristotle, 
“virtue is a middle road between two evils” (Ketola 2008b, p. 76), in which rationality 
and emotion work together in harmony. The main challenge of virtue-based ethics is its 
abstractedness and difficulty. It is rather challenging for many organizations to develop 
a virtuous character if they have nurtured the psychopathic side of their persona (see 
Ketola 2008b). However, it is worth a try, as such a character is never unachievable. 
And in the context of sustainable development, the attempt can even be considered as a 
necessity. In our quest for a livable planet, virtue-based ethics suggests that an 
organization should act sustainably because sustainability is a virtue. The two evils 
between which sustainability could be positioned are extreme extravagancy and 
affluence, which is achieved through continuous socioeconomic activity that leads to the 
maximal use of resources and stress on ecosystems, and extreme scarcity and poverty, 
which is achieved through refraining from any socioeconomic activity and the 
liquidation of one’s own life in order to achieve the minimal use of resources and stress 




Normative ethical theories for sustainable development in corporations 
 
Utility-based ethics Duty-based ethics Virtue-based ethics 
It is beneficial that 
corporations act in line 
with sustainable 
development 
It is a corporate duty to 
act in line with 
sustainable 
development 
A virtuous corporation 
acts in line with 
sustainable 
development 
“Sustainability as a 
utility” 
“Sustainability as a 
duty” 




There is an ontological, collective deficiency in all three normative ethical theories. 
They are all anthropocentric. The theories consider humans as the most significant 
object in the universe and interpret the world as if all humans would agree to perceived 
life only through human experience and value. In the quest for sustainable development, 
where we seek development that does not endanger existence but sustains and embraces 
it in all its forms, we need to extend utility-, duty-, and virtue-based ethics to also cover 
nonhuman existence. This is not, however, a problem, as many biocentric authors, such 
as the philosopher Arne Naess, have worked with this issue for decades (for 
organization and management studies, see Ketola 2010; Heikkurinen et al. 2016). To 
avoid the trap of anthropocentrism, Naess, in his book Ecology, community and lifestyle 
(1989), provides an outline of an ecosophy that gives inherent worth to all living beings, 
regardless of their instrumental utility for human needs. However, such broadened 
egalitarianism only works only in principle. This is because “any realistic praxis 
necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression” (Naess 1989/2001, p. 28). 
Moreover, Naess (ibid) explains biospherical egalitarianism as follows: 
 
The ecological field worker acquires a deep-seated respect, even veneration, for ways and forms of 
life. He reaches an understanding from within, a kind of understanding that others reserve for 
fellow men and for a narrow selection of ways and forms of life. To the ecological field worker, 
the equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to 
human is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans themselves. 
This quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from close 
partnership with other forms of life. The attempt to ignore our dependence and to establish a 
master–slave role has contributed to the alienation of man from himself. 
 
In other words, and perhaps somewhat paradoxically, we humans may become forced to 
leave still largely prevailing anthropocentric premises behind in order to save our 
species while not destroying others. In practice, this would firstly mean recognizing the 
agent’s place within the complex biosphere. This has a fundamental message for 
structure–agency problematization , as it forces us to admit the hierarchical relationship 
between the biosphere (structure) and organization (agent). An agent (a human 
organization) cannot exist without the structure (the biosphere), but the structure surely 
can exist without the agent. If we assume the biosphere not only as a structure but also 
as the ultimate principal, then we could say that the principal (the biosphere) might even 
be better off without the agent (a human organization), as it does not act in line with the 
interests of the principal. To respect the structures and the principal, we need an agent-





While utility and motive-based ethics are surely important in the pursuit of sustainable 
development, virtue-based ethics offers solid groundings for a moral agency to develop 
because of its focus on the character itself (Ketola 2008a). Slote (1997, p. 240) 
distinguishes virtue-based ethics, which focuses more on virtuous characters and their 
traits, from more agent-focused theories that “treat the moral or ethical status of actions 
as entirely derivate from independent and fundamental ethical/aretaic facts (or claims) 
about the motives, dispositions, or inner life of the individuals who perform them.” 
Such an agent-focused approach to virtue is well suited to the challenge of sustainable 
development, as (a) sustainability is largely defined by the external environment of the 
agent and (b) the biosphere is the ultimate principal of all agents on the planet. An 
approach to virtue-based ethics that places special emphasis on the development of non-
anthropocentric moral character (e.g., Ketola 2010) makes it an excellent platform to 
analyze organized economic activity in relation to the natural environment. Business 
organizations can now “create environments that can either favor or hinder the personal 
development of workers” (Fontrodona et al. 2013, p. 563), as well the moral 
development of the organization as a collective of humans (Ketola 2010) and nonhuman 
beings. 
 
Even though sustainable development can be argued from utility- and duty-based ethical 
theories, it is suggested that virtue-based ethics with an agent-focused twist is well 
suited to the challenge of sustainable development. The idea of virtue offers an 
important lens to examine the moral development of organizational character , while the 
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